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Abstract 
 
We review and assess research findings from 120+ papers in accounting, finance, and law 
to evaluate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We describe significant developments 
in how the Act was implemented and find that despite severe criticism, the Act and 
institutions it created have survived almost intact since enactment. We report survey 
findings from informed parties that suggest that the Act has produced financial reporting 
benefits. While the direct costs of the Act were substantial and fell disproportionately on 
smaller companies, costs have fallen over time and in response to changes in its 
implementation. Research about indirect costs such as loss of risk taking in the U.S. is 
inconclusive.  The evidence for and social welfare implications of claimed effects such as 
fewer IPOs or loss of foreign listings are unclear.  Financial reporting quality appears to 
have gone up after SOX but research on causal attribution is weak.  On balance, research 
on the Act's net social welfare remains inconclusive. We end by outlining challenges 
facing research in this area, and propose an agenda for better modeling costs and benefits 
of financial regulation. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article we review and assess over 120 studies of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
focusing on research in accounting, law, and finance after 2005.  We describe major 
developments in its legal, regulatory and institutional implementation (Part 1) and its 
effects on US corporate law, disclosure practices, and other countries’ laws (Part 2), and 
the propensity of companies to go or remain public in the US (Part 3).  We also note a 
puzzle regarding the Act’s reception in public debate.  On the one hand, the law 
continues to be fiercely and relentlessly attacked in the US, particularly in political 
election battles and during legislative debates, reflected in part in provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the JOBS Act, which can be seen as a partial legislative rollback of the 
Act.  On the other hand, survey evidence (reviewed in Part 4) suggests that informed 
observers, including corporate officers and investors, do not believe that the Act – as 
implemented, taking into account significant relaxations of its most criticized provision 
(section 404(b) internal control attestation) – has been a significant problem, and may 
well have produced net benefits, and the law has been copied at least in part by other 
countries.  What explains this puzzle of continued hostility amid acquiescence or even 
mild praise by those most directly affected by the Act? 
We would have liked to have then evaluated the Act itself, at least provisionally, 
but as we explain, the state of research is such that – even after ten years – no conclusions 
can be drawn about the net costs (Part 5) and benefits (Part 6) of the Act, its effects on net 
shareholder wealth (Part 7), or other research relevant to its assessment (Part 8).  We 
suggest that the puzzle of the Act’s reception may be explained in part by the 
inconclusive state of research on its costs and benefits, and so follows a two-part pattern 2 
that may be generalized to most types of regulation in the spheres of financial 
institutions, markets, and corporate governance.  First – as with most types of regulation 
– the Act had clear, non-trivial and quantifiable direct costs.  Second, the tasks of 
estimating either the benefits or the indirect costs of the Act are at least an order of 
magnitude more difficult than the task of estimating direct costs, and are possibly beyond 
the present capacity of researchers to achieve with much precision.   
Absent research designs adequate to the task of drawing even provisionally 
reliable causal inferences about the Act’s full range of effects, the prior beliefs of 
researchers about its net benefits – which range from large and positive to large and 
negative – remain largely unaffected by the research that has been done.  Absent 
scholarly consensus, political entrepreneurs have used clear (if overstated) evidence on 
direct costs to deride the Act as a symbol of regulatory overreach, despite the view 
among informed observers that the costs and benefits of the law as implemented have 
been at worst roughly equivalent and possibly net positive.   
The stakes implicit in the ongoing uncertainty about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are 
large, with lessons for policy-makers and researchers.  In Part 9, we sketch a research 
agenda in light of our literature review and assessment.  For researchers, the challenges 
are to develop methods that better specify and estimate (or at least bound) the Act’s 
potential benefits, as well as its indirect costs, and we preliminarily suggest ways forward 
on these tasks.  For policy-makers, the challenges are how to better design future 
regulatory (or de- or re-regulatory) interventions so as to permit more reliable inferences 
about their effects, to improve the quality of information about whether they have led to 
net benefits, and to reduce the risk that pure politics, untethered by fact or reason, will 3 
continue to generate unnecessarily costly oscillation in systemically important laws, 
regulations and institutions that form the foundations of capitalism.  These tasks are all 
the more important given ongoing efforts to legally mandate quantified cost-benefit 
analysis of financial regulation, which our findings here suggest remains aspirational, 
rather than feasible.
1 
 
1  Sarbanes-Oxley Act remains largely intact, with significant modifications to 
section 404’s implementation 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX or the Act) was intended to improve auditing of US 
public companies, consistent with the law’s official name –  the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002.  The Act had two core goals:  
(a)  to create a quasi-public institution to oversee and regulate auditing, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and (b) to enlist auditors more 
extensively in the enforcement of existing laws against theft and fraud by corporate 
officers, pursuant to regulations from and enforcement by PCAOB.  Reinforcing this core 
were new rules concerning the relationships between public companies and their auditors.   
1.1 PCAOB is a durable and significant part of the regulatory landscape. 
Prior to SOX, auditors were subject only to state licensing and lightly enforced self-
regulation.  From 1978, a part-time “Public Oversight Board” oversaw auditors, but was 
dominated by audit firms and had little authority.  Recognizing that Congress was in no 
position to legislate auditing standards in detail, Congress delegated that task in the Act, 
not to an existing or new public regulatory body, such as the Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
1 For discussion of cost-benefit analysis and legal efforts to mandate it, see Coates (2014). 4 
Commission (SEC), nor to leave it in private hands of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), but instead to create a unique new hybrid public/private 
agency in the form of the PCAOB.   
PCAOB is a non-profit private corporation charged with the public function of 
overseeing auditors of SEC-registered companies with the goals of protecting investors 
and the public interest in the “preparation of informative, fair and independent audit 
reports.”  PCAOB’s main tasks are to register, set standards for, inspect, investigate, and 
discipline public company audit firms.  Two but only two of its five full-time directors 
are auditors, and all of its directors serve staggered five-year terms after being appointed 
by the SEC.  The SEC must approve the PCAOB’s budget and regulations, but PCAOB 
is empowered to directly tax (formally, impose fees on) public companies and audit 
firms.  As a result, its funding is sheltered from the normal Congressional budget process.  
As a private organization, PCAOB is exempt from so-called “sunshine” laws and can 
operate largely without the constant pressure of public scrutiny that applies to the SEC 
and other public bodies.  PCAOB can set and enforce regulations, enjoys broad immunity 
from private lawsuits, and its communications are sheltered behind a regulatory privilege, 
making them generally not subject to ordinary discovery in lawsuits against audit firms. 
This hybrid public/private structure led to a high-profile lawsuit challenging the 
PCAOB as unconstitutionally invading the sphere of the executive branch (Free 
Enterprise Fund et al. v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board et al.). In 2010, 
the US Supreme Court largely upheld the agency’s design and structure, striking down 
only a provision of the Act that limited removal of PCAOB directors to situations of 
misbehavior (“for cause”), increasing the theoretical power of the SEC over the PCAOB.  5 
A broader effort to overturn SOX altogether in the same lawsuit was turned back, 
however, and PCAOB is now a durable part of the regulatory landscape, largely intact 
despite frequent political attacks on SOX itself.
2  PCAOB has a staff of over 600 and an 
annual budget of $180 million. Its budget has grown significantly since 2002, both 
absolutely and relative to benchmarks such as the SEC’s budget – PCAOB’s budget is 
now roughly one sixth of the SEC’s budget, as illustrated in Figure  1 panel A. By 
contrast, while the SEC received a large boost in its own budget in 2003, partly as a result 
of SOX, its budget has grown more slowly, roughly one-third the PCAOB growth rate 
since 2003 (see Figure 1 panel B). 
-  Insert Figure 1 here –  
1.2 The audit firm / issuer relationship remains as SOX left it. 
Just as the structure of PCAOB remains largely unchanged since SOX, so too 
does the shape of another major focus of SOX:  the relationships between audit firms and 
public company issuers.  In SOX, as well in contemporaneous changes in stock exchange 
listing standards (discussed in section 2.1), those relationships were significantly 
changed.  Major changes were made (a) to increase the independence of audit committees 
of public companies, (b) to transfer control of the audit firm relationship to audit 
committees (from management and the board as a whole), and (c) to give audit 
committees plenary authority to hire and pay audit firms and other advisors needed for 
such committees to conduct their now-statutorily mandated responsibilities. These 
                                                 
2 One minor change in the design of PCAOB was adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010:  the PCAOB 
was required to create and populate an investor advisory board, similar to (and in fact overlapping in 
membership with) the SEC’s advisory committee, also created by that law.  On the advisory board are 
representatives of large institutional advisors such as CalPERs, TIAA-CREF, Vanguard, and the AFL-CIO; 
accounting academics; corporate governance professionals; and retired judges and regulatory officials.   
While the advisory board has no formal power, it represents a direct channel of communication from the 
investor community to PCAOB, and may further buffer the influence of the audit industry over PCAOB. 6 
changes represented a significant change to basic corporate law and governance, which 
traditionally had been determined at the state (not federal) level, and which traditionally 
had given the full board of directors authority to delegate whatever authority over the 
audit firm relationship as it saw fit (including to management of a public company).  In 
addition, SOX mandated audit partner rotation every five years, and banned many non-
audit services that had formed the backbone of the consulting businesses that each of the 
large audit firms had developed alongside their traditional audit lines of business.  
While SOX prohibited audit firms from providing many (but not all) types of 
consulting services to their audit clients, just slightly preceding SOX, four of the then Big 
5 audit firms spun off their consulting arms into separate entities in 2000 and 2001; 
Deloitte being the only one to not do so. Despite this drastic change in business models 
arising from the spin-offs, consulting services still account for a large share of revenues 
for the big audit firms. Non-audit fees to audit clients as a proportion of total fees fell 
from almost 51 percent of fees in 2002 to about 21 percent in 2005 and have remained 
steady at that level since then till recently and were around 22 percent in 2012 (Audit 
Analytics, 2013).  But these services are now largely provided to companies that are not 
audit clients.   
Few changes have been made to the rules governing the relationships between audit 
firms and public company issuers since SOX.  In 2003, the GAO released a study on 
audit firm rotation (as opposed to audit partner rotation), but little was done to pursue 
further reform until 2012, when the PCAOB issued a concept release on the topic, 
prompted in part by proposals by the European Community in December 2011 to require 
audit firm rotation every six years.  The PCAOB release generated 630 public comments, 7 
and attracted some support in the academic community (e.g., Bazerman and Moore 
2011).  However, as of this writing, neither the PCAOB nor the SEC has followed up on 
the idea.  On July 8, 2013, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1564, the “Audit 
Integrity and Job Protection Act,” which would amend SOX to prohibit PCAOB from 
requiring auditor rotation, but as of this writing, the Senate has not taken up the bill. 
1.3 Internal control attestation (section 404(b)) has been significantly modified in the 
course of implementation. 
The other core component of SOX – the mandate that public companies obtain audit 
firm attestation over their internal control (IC) systems –  proved to be the most 
controversial. In general terms, SOX required companies to pay audit firms for what were 
initially costly, time-consuming, detailed, and what many viewed as unjustified reviews 
of companies’ policies, procedures and technologies for preventing theft and fraud.   
These requirements produced sufficiently loud, widespread, and sustained complaints 
that PCAOB made significant changes in how SOX section 404 was implemented. Even 
there, however, the requirement of attestation remains intact for most public companies, 
and neither Congress nor PCAOB has adopted major changes to the attestation process 
since 2007.   
Contrary to popular impression, SOX did not mandate any particular change in 
companies’ control systems.  In 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act required public 
companies to have an IC system that would provide “reasonable assurances” that 
“transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in 
conformity” with GAAP, and nothing in SOX changed this requirement.  Even after 8 
SOX, a public company can if it chooses adopt any IC system it believes meets that 
requirement – even one with what its auditors believe are significant weaknesses.   
What SOX section 404 did was to force disclosure of IC weaknesses, and then to rely 
on pressures that flow from such disclosures to cause companies to improve their 
systems.
3  Only if market forces or litigation risks are sufficiently powerful do companies 
actually need to change their behavior, in the form of investments to or fees related to 
their IC systems.  An open question at the time SOX was adopted was the extent to which 
firms would incur all expenses necessary to avoid negative statements about IC 
weaknesses, or whether they allow weaknesses to exist and persist, despite possible 
negative market reactions to the disclosures of those weaknesses required by SOX. 
As discussed more in Part 5 below, SOX-mandated disclosures did induce significant 
direct costs.  Partly because of those costs, and the criticism that followed, each of the 
SEC, PCAOB, and Congress have taken further post-SOX actions in response.  The SEC 
deferred implementation of section 404 for companies with market capitalizations of less 
than $75 million, and extended that deferral several times, until 2010, when Congress 
made it permanent in the Dodd-Frank Act.  In 2006, the SEC adopted a rule permitting 
firms to defer implementation of section 404 for up to two years after going public, which 
Congress extended to up to five years in 2012 for all but the largest newly public 
companies (i.e., those with market capitalizations under $700 million and revenues and 
non-convertible debt under $1 billion).   
                                                 
3 SOX section 302 likewise imposes only disclosure obligations on CEOs and CFOs, requiring them to 
certify that a company’s SEC filings do not contain material misstatements or omissions, that the officers 
have evaluated their companies’ control systems, which have been designed to ensure material information 
is disclosed to the officers, and that they have disclosed to the audit committee all significant deficiencies 
or material weaknesses in the control system. 9 
For firms subject to section 404, the PCAOB in 2007 adopted Audit Standard 5, 
which significantly relaxed the attestation requirements from those initially adopted in 
Audit Standard 2 in 2004.  Among other things, the 2007 changes permit a unified audit 
and attestation process; top-down risk-based approaches that permit audit firms to focus 
on key control risks; the use of “scaled” approaches to take account of firm or IC system 
component size; the ability to rely on the work of others in the attestation process, so less 
expensive employees or third party vendors can directly perform some of the work 
required; and the replacement of time-consuming and elaborate “walk-throughs” with 
other methods of testing IC systems.   
In a large SEC survey conducted after these changes, most respondents reported these 
changes had been economically meaningful, reducing costs by 25% or more per year 
(SEC 2009).  Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon (2010) find that relative to the initial AS2 
benchmark, AS5 audit fees became lower on average for all clients and better aligned 
with client fraud risk (i.e., lower for lower fraud risk clients and higher for clients with 
higher fraud risk). As implemented, then, SOX’s requirements of IC disclosures and 
attestation have been significantly loosened, both as to what companies are covered and 
to what the Act requires.  Any fair assessment of SOX as initially enacted would 
acknowledge that the possibility of such loosening in response to pushback during 
implementation was part of Congress’s original design, because it gave the PCAOB 
power to relax its initial requirements precisely in this way.  We return to this point in 
Parts 2.2 and 5, below, as it may partly explain divergent assessments of SOX.  
 
2   Qualitative evidence of SOX’s impacts 10 
SOX and the rules adopted under it by the SEC and PCAOB have now had ten years 
to shape behavior.  Before we review studies that try to measure SOX’s costs and 
benefits, this section reviews qualitative evidence on some of the specific effects that 
were predicted as consequences of SOX, including:  (a) whether SOX “federalized” 
corporate law, as commonly asserted by its critics; (b) whether SOX has functioned as a 
“command and control” law, as many have assumed, or more in the nature of a “comply 
or explain” disclosure-forcing law, often asserted to be more true of similar laws in other 
countries; and (c) whether other countries have followed or repudiated the US 
innovations in SOX.  Our general conclusions are that SOX had little impact on the 
federal/state balance of legal authority over corporations, has functioned to force 
disclosure, which in turn has combined with market forces to induce significant changes 
in control systems, and has been partly but not completely copied by other countries. 
2.1 Lack of federalization of corporate law 
One prominent criticism immediately following SOX was that it “federalized” 
corporate law (e.g., Romano 2005; Butler and Ribstein 2006).  Straightforwardly, the law 
did not do this.  Other than through the changes in the audit committee / audit firm 
relationship discussed above, and a relatively toothless ban on loans to public company 
executive officers, SOX did little directly to alter “corporate governance” or the state 
laws and stock exchange listing standards that shape governance practices. While major 
changes in corporate governance did coincide with SOX, they were the result of changes 
in listing standards adopted by stock exchanges themselves (see Coates 2007: 109-112) 
for more discussion). 11 
However, it remained possible that SOX would have powerful effects on corporate 
governance in two indirect ways.  First, it might pave the way for more Congressional 
intervention, representing a step on a slippery slope to a series of federal legislative 
changes to corporate law and governance (e.g., Ribstein and Butler 2006).  Second, it 
might result in changes in state law as a result of shareholders suing under state law but 
using SOX’s requirements as a basis for doing so, with the result that SOX would 
effectively create new standards of conduct for corporate directors (e.g., Burch 2006; 
Ferola 2007; Jones 2004).   
Ten years later, it is apparent that neither of these possibilities has come about.  While 
the Dodd-Frank Act may represent a modest example of the first possible indirect effect, 
in that it contained general corporate governance provisions that went beyond the 
financial industry, those changes are even more modest than those in SOX itself.  “Say on 
pay” is perhaps the most well-known part of Dodd-Frank’s corporate governance 
provisions, but that requirement merely imposes a non-binding shareholder vote on 
executive compensation, and fewer than two percent of US public companies have 
experienced a negative vote since its implementation.  Other aspects of Dodd-Frank fall 
squarely into the “comply or explain” category, such as a requirement that public 
companies disclose whether they have two different individuals serving as chairman of 
the board and CEO, or are extremely modest in their effects, with its authorization for 
(but not a requirement that) the SEC to adopt regulations permitting shareholders to 
nominate one to three directors in the company’s proxy statement (allowing 
economization on costs for nomination of a minority of directors), a step that Kahan and 
Rock (2011) call “insignificant.”  Further, the most significant set of changes to US 12 
securities laws since SOX can be found not in Dodd-Frank, but in JOBS Act, a 2012 law 
that mandated the SEC adopt a number of new exemptions from the disclosure and 
registration requirements of the federal securities laws –  precisely in the opposite 
direction that SOX critics predicted.  Indeed, by expanding exemptions for widely traded 
but unlisted firms, the JOBS Act greatly cut back the scope of SOX’s coverage. 
Turning to state law, a comprehensive review of all Delaware court decisions 
(n=1293) in the period 2002 to 2012 shows that only fifteen referred in any way to SOX 
or its provisions.  Of those, not one imposed liability on directors for failing to adhere to 
standards or live up to obligations created by SOX.  In fact, no such decision even 
allowed such a claim to go to trial.  Nor has there been a material change in the formal 
standards of Delaware case law (for example by tightening the definition of what it 
means to be an “independent” director, as asserted by Ferola 2007
4).  Nor is there any 
evident pattern in outcomes of decisions holding corporate directors personally liable (see 
Black, Cheffins, and Klausner 2006), or in a significantly higher risk of liability for 
officers, despite section 302 of the Act (see Vogel 2009).  Broad claims that SOX has 
distorted Delaware case law turn out to be overstated at best.  Roe (2009) may be right 
that the fact or threat of lawmaking by Congress or the SEC influences Delaware judges, 
but the influences are subtle and hard to see in the case law overall.  It may be more 
accurate to understood both federal and state lawmakers reacting simultaneously to time-
varying public pressures and political demand for corporate accountability.   
                                                 
4 Compare In re The Limited, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) and In re J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co. Shareholder Litigation, 906 A.2d 2005 (Del. Ch. 2005) (pre- and post-SOX cases, both citing 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), both defining “disinterested and independent” director 
in nearly identical terms and both finding a director “independent” despite being an executive of company 
with significant business relations with the director’s company). 
 13 
In sum, whatever the effects of SOX more broadly, it has not had the effect of 
“federalizing” corporate law to any meaningful extent.  Delaware (and other states) laws, 
together with stock exchange listing standards, remain the core of corporate governance 
in the US, even for public companies.  (We discuss data on SOX’s effect on federal 
securities litigation, as opposed to state corporate litigation, below.) 
2.2 SOX’s “comply or explain” features in operation 
Another criticism of SOX was that was excessively “mandatory,” directly requiring 
changes in business decisions, contrary to the tradition of US federal securities laws’ 
focus on disclosure, which permitted business decisions to be made in light of market 
forces.  As discussed above, in one key respect this criticism of SOX was misguided – 
section 404 of SOX, which requires attestation of IC systems, is effectively a “comply or 
explain” regime, in that it permits companies to allow IC systems to contain weaknesses, 
as long as that fact is disclosed as part of their own disclosures (and by the audit firm 
providing the attestation).  Nevertheless, it was possible that market reactions and 
litigation risks associated with IC system weaknesses would be such that no public 
company would allow them to persist, once identified by an audit firm (even if company 
officials disagreed with the audit firm). Indeed, Hammersley et al. (2007) document a 
market reaction of negative 0.95% for material weakness disclosures suggesting that the 
material weakness disclosure reports have value relevant information. Ashbaugh et al. 
(2009) report a 93 basis point increase in cost of equity around the first disclosure of an 
IC deficiency. Further, firms that remediate IC deficiencies benefit by a 151-point 
decrease in cost of equity.  Most interestingly, Ashbaugh et al report that firms that firms 
with characteristics making them appear to be most likely to report IC problems but did 14 
not report such problems, instead reporting an unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion, 
experienced a 116 basis point decrease in cost of equity.   
However, Johnstone et al. (2011) shows that many US public companies disclose 
persistent IC weaknesses.  In the three years ending 2006, they found 733 US companies 
disclosed a material weakness.  By the end of year one, most (59%) had remedied the 
weakness, consistent with market forces and litigation risk pressuring companies to 
eliminate such weaknesses by incurring IC costs.  Even after three years, nearly a third 
(30%) continued to disclose the same IC weakness.  
Related evidence on this comes from Rice and Weber (2011).  They find a significant 
proportion of firms fail to report material weaknesses when they exist. Only 32.4% of 
firms that subsequently made a material restatement previously reported a material 
weakness. That is, most firms did not report the IC weakness when it existed, instead 
reporting the weakness after a more serious restatement had occurred.  (Not all 
restatements result from control weaknesses, but material restatements often trigger re-
evaluation of a firm’s control systems by both the firm and its auditors.)  This suggests 
that for a significant number of public companies, SOX’s section 404 has functioned at 
least in part in a “comply or explain” fashion, contrary to strong characterizations of that 
part of the law as “mandating” corporate governance changes.   
Further Rice, Weber, and Wu (2013) show weak incentives for timely reporting of 
section 404 weaknesses.  They find firms that do not report a timely IC weakness and 
later have a restatement are in fact less likely to have class action lawsuits, SEC 
sanctions, and management and auditor turnover compared to firms with restatement 
where the IC weakness had been previously reported. They attribute this result to the 15 
plausible claims by managers of firms not reporting IC weaknesses that they were 
unaware of the underlying conditions that led to misstatements compared to cases where 
the IC weakness had been previously disclosed.  This suggests that the SOX 404 in 
operation may not only permit firms to continue to maintain IC systems with weaknesses, 
but may even create perverse incentives to hide IC weaknesses until a restatement forces 
the company to reveal them.  Far from being too stringent, section 404 as implemented 
may be milder than would be ideal for a firm’s investors. 
2.3 SOX-like laws in other countries 
A third worry expressed by SOX skeptics was that the US would drive public 
company listings overseas, to regimes less burdened with regulation.  Before we review 
data on that possible effect in Part 3, it is worth noting that many countries imitated the 
US in adopting SOX-like statutes or regulations following the market downturn in 2001. 
(Kim and Lu (2013) provide a comprehensive listing of corporate governance reforms 
undertaken in 26 advanced and emerging economies.) In 2006, for example, Japan 
adopted its own so-called “J-SOX” statute, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, 
which contained provisions equivalent to those in both sections 302 and 404 of SOX.  In 
2006, the European Union, too, adopted an Eighth Directive on securities disclosure, 
which largely tracked much of the contents of SOX.  One nominal difference between the 
way that the European directive was implemented in member states (such as the UK and 
the Netherlands) was that officer certifications were required, as under SOX section 302, 
but audit firm attestations as required in SOX section 404 were not.   
More generally, a broader contrast is often asserted between the US “mandatory” 
regime in SOX and the “comply or explain” regime in the EU, and it is true that most of 16 
the EU member state implementations include “comply or explain” components.  But so 
too does the US (as discussed in the prior section). The stark contrast often suggested is 
an overstatement at best.   
A more important distinction between the way that SOX was implemented in the US 
and how its equivalents were implemented elsewhere is that the “comply or explain” 
component is not well enforced in many non-US regimes.  Van de Poel & Vanstraelen 
(2011) find, for example, that while firms complying with the Dutch equivalent of SOX 
section 302 experience fewer abnormal or discretionary accruals in the period 2004-05, 
non-complying firms’ accruals showed no relationship with the extent that they explained 
why they did not comply, consistent with the “explain” aspects of Dutch law not 
generating market-relevant information, or exerting a strong degree of pressure on Dutch 
firms.  It would be interesting to apply the same method to US firms reporting persistent 
IC weaknesses to test whether the combination of US disclosure requirements and US 
market forces are any more powerful than those in the Netherlands. 
Why did other countries adopt SOX-like laws? In the absence of research evidence, 
one could conjecture that, to an extent, the heightened awareness of corporate frauds 
revealed in the economic downturn in early 2000s drove adoption of new laws to deter 
fraud.  The governance template provided by SOX made it easier for countries to copy 
the law.  Global transmission of regulatory (or best practice) guidelines has been 
observed before (e.g. board independence rules) and is an interesting topic that has not 
received much attention in the accounting, finance or legal literatures. 
 
3  SOX’s effects on going private, going dark, going public, and cross-listings 17 
Another set of predictions commonly advanced by critics of SOX is that it would 
increase the marginal cost of being a US-registered public company more than the 
benefits of that status, causing existing public firms to go private or go dark, and 
deterring other companies from going public or cross-listing in the US.  A substantial 
number of studies have attempted to test these predictions by looking at firm behavior 
before and after SOX’s passage.  The going-dark, going-private and cross-listing studies 
produce similar results – smaller, less liquid and more fraud-prone firms did indeed exit 
US stock markets after SOX – but the evidence that SOX reduced the number of IPOs is 
weak at best, and is offset by evidence that IPO pricing improved.  More generally, the 
design of these studies is such that the relevance of their findings to an assessment of 
SOX remains unclear, as changes in the number of public companies can only be 
evaluated together with the propensity of those companies to commit fraud and the costs 
of such fraud. 
3.1 Going private 
Engel, Hayes and Wang (2007) report the propensity to go private spiked in the 33 
months after SOX, relative to the same period prior to SOX (see Figure 2).  This effect is 
concentrated among smaller, less liquid firms with growth prospects that are lower than 
either prior to SOX or as compared to companies that remain public post-SOX.  They 
report a median market value for firms going private post-SOX of $23 million, less than 
half than that of firms going private pre-SOX, and less than one seventh that of their 
overall CRSP/Compustat sample.  Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley (2009) confirm 
these findings in a difference-in-difference design, comparing going private deals by US 
firms with those by foreign firms before and after SOX.  They find no increase for US 18 
firms overall, but do find more going private deals by US firms with market 
capitalizations under $30 million.   
-  Insert Figure 2 here – 
Interestingly, then, the majority of firms going private post-SOX were small enough 
that they would never have had to comply with SOX section 404, which as noted above 
did not and continues not to apply to $75 million or under firms.  Indeed, Gao, Wu and 
Zimmerman 2009 find evidence that firms took steps to “manage” their market 
capitalizations to remain below this threshold, and so to remain exempt from section 404.  
This calls into question whether going private decisions immediately after SOX by small 
firms were in fact motivated by SOX.  Such transactions may instead have either been a 
response to contemporaneous changes in the financial and legal environments (including 
low interest rates and a rise in private equity buyout activity), or a mistaken expectation 
of how SOX would in fact be implemented over time, or both.  Consistent with this 
possibility is the fact that Leuz (2007) finds that going-private trends in the U.K. were 
similar to those in the U.S. after SOX. 
Bartlett (2006) further shows that going private does not per se exempt issuers from 
the Act, as such transactions often entail issues of high-yield debt that require continued 
SEC reporting and SOX-compliance.  Empirically there was no post-SOX shift in buyout 
financing (e.g., towards bank debt) that would have exempted newly private companies 
from the Act, except among firms under ~$220 million in book value.  In fact, buyers of 
large firms were more reliant after SOX on debt financing that triggers ongoing SOX-
compliance even after the target firms have gone private. 
3.2 Going dark 19 
Similarly, more companies chose to “go dark” (i.e., deregister their common stock 
and thus suspend their SEC reporting obligations) after SOX (Leuz et al., 2008):  370 
from 2002-2004 versus 114 from 1998-2001 (see Figure 2).  Leuz et al. are careful to 
exploit several events in the phase-in and extended exemptions for small firms from 
section 404, making their findings less likely to have been caused by contemporaneous 
changes in the legal and financial environment. They find that firms that go dark are 
smaller, have poorer performance, weaker growth opportunities, and are closer to 
financial distress, than firms that do not go dark.  Leuz et al. (2008) also find that that 
firms that go dark have weaker accounting quality, larger free cash flow problems, and 
weaker board governance and outside monitoring.  These findings raise the question 
whether there is a net social cost or benefit from going dark (and similar) transactions, 
given such characteristics may indicate they pose more fraud risk, even if such 
transactions were privately optimal for the managers of the firms involved and even if 
they were in fact caused by SOX. 
3.3 Going public 
Some critics of SOX have also claimed that the costs of SOX, especially the burden 
of section 404 compliance on small firms, contributed to fewer IPOs in the US in the 
2000s (e.g., Mitchell et al. 2011).  The drop-off in IPOs is most pronounced for small 
firms, consistent with a SOX explanation.  Bova et al. (2013) document a related finding 
– US private companies, especially smaller ones, are more likely to be acquired rather 20 
than raise financing through an IPO, post-SOX, unlike a control sample in the U.K., a 
result that could also contribute to the IPO drop-off.
 5 
Such claims in the period leading up 2012 motivated deferral of IC compliance for 
“emerging growth firms” in the JOBS Act.  However, Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) show 
that the downward trend in IPOs started well before SOX (see Figure 3, where the drop in 
small firm IPOs occurred in 2001, before SOX’s passage).  Gao, et al., also document 
that despite the SEC revising rules to reduce compliance costs burden on small 
companies, and then small firms being permanently exempted by Congress in the Dodd-
Frank Act, the number of small IPOs has not increased.  Gao et al. (2013) attribute the 
drop-off in IPOs to the absence of profitable small companies and technological changes 
that make economics of scope and ability to speed products to markets more important 
than in the past, giving an advantage to larger firms.  
-  Insert Figure 3 here – 
While the evidence of SOX’s effect on the number of IPOs in the US remains 
contested, the pricing of the IPOs that did occur after SOX improved.  Johnson and 
Madura (2009) find that first-day returns of IPOs in the US have declined in the US (but 
not in a matched sample of Canadian IPOs not subject to SOX) – that is, US IPOs have 
not been as underpriced as similar IPOs had been in the past.  In other words, IPO pricing 
became less uncertain, consistent with issuers incurring lower capital costs as a result.   
They also find that one-year mean and median returns after post-SOX IPOs ceased to be 
                                                 
5 One can also observe a big spurt in IPOs by smaller firms in the mid to late 1990s.  Given the higher rate 
of failure for small firms in general, one would expect a higher rate of de-listings by smaller firms. This 
poses a challenge to inferring a SOX effect on the higher rates of going dark and going private transactions 
post-SOX in the literature discussed in Parts 3.1 and 3.2.  21 
negative, as had characterized the pre-SOX period, which Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
suggest was caused by a correction of first-day excess returns.   
3.4  Cross-listings 
Concerns have also been expressed about fewer foreign firms choosing to list in the 
US post-SOX, a concern empirically validated in the data (see Figure 4). Piotroski and 
Srinivasan (2008) find that fewer foreign firms enter US equity markets post-SOX 
compared to pre-SOX, and that defecting firms are more likely to list in London.  Firms 
that defect to London are smaller, less profitable, less likely to have a Big-4/5 auditor, 
and are more likely to be based in developed countries. These firm characteristics are 
consistent with costs of SOX being higher for smaller companies (as with US firms going 
dark), while the benefits of a US listing are lesser for firms from developed countries.  
-  Insert Figure 4 here – 
However, the fewer numbers of listings hide the fact that the firms that choose to list 
in the US post-SOX are larger, more profitable companies from less developed countries. 
Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) attribute this to the greater value from SOX driven 
control and monitoring in the US for larger firms that increases the benefits of a US 
listing, consistent with the bonding hypothesis (Coffee 1999). In market capitalization 
terms, these larger cross-listing firms more than make up for the loss in listings by small 
firms, resulting in a net gain in market capitalization from foreign listings into the US, 
post-SOX.  Bond market evidence is similar. Fewer foreign firms enter US public bond 
markets, but those that do also have equity listed in the US, are adopters of International 
Financial Reporting Standards, and are larger bond issuers (Gao 2011). 22 
Foreign firms are also materially more likely to delist from US equity markets after 
SOX (see Figure 4). Again, as with US firms going dark, delisting firms are smaller and 
have low trading volumes in US exchanges (Marosi and Massoud 2008; Woo 2011). 
These firms had weaker governance (e.g., less independent boards, higher separation of 
control and cash flow rights, indicating greater agency problems), and were from 
countries with weaker investor protections (Hostak et al. 2013). While investors in these 
firms presumably suffered when the firms deregistered, and managers and controlling 
shareholders benefited by cutting compliance costs and market scrutiny, the social impact 
on the US is less clear.  Similar to domestic US firms that deregistered, foreign firms that 
delisted have characteristics that make them more likely to have accounting problems and 
fraud. 
 
4. Survey evidence – perceptions of SOX’s effects 
Before we turn to “hard” evidence on the costs and benefits of SOX, we review 
“soft” evidence from surveys of informed participants in the capital markets on the 
specific effects and the costs and benefits of the law.  A survey of 336 chief financial 
officers of companies considering “going public,” conducted in 2003 and published in the 
Journal of Finance by Brau and Fawcett (2006) showed that neither SOX section 404 nor 
SEC disclosure requirements more generally were a “significant concern” for such 
officers, consistent with the findings of Gao et al. (2013) discussed above.   
The SEC conducted a comprehensive survey on the economic effects of section 
404 between December 2008 and January 2009, which received responses from 2901 
companies representing over half the companies filing Sec 404(b) reports at that time.  23 
Based on this sample, Alexander et al. (2013) report a causal link between section 404 
compliance and improvements in quality of the firms’ information environment such as a 
positive impact on IC structures, quality of financial reporting and firm’s ability to 
prevent and detect fraud. Despite respondents’ recognition of specific benefits, only 19% 
perceived a net benefit for fiscal years completed after the 2007 reforms, with another 
20% saying the costs and benefits were equivalent.   
The number perceiving a net benefit from section 404 rose to 26% for 
respondents with fiscal years still in progress at the time of the survey, with another 20% 
believing the costs and benefits were equivalent – suggesting a trend towards greater 
acceptance of section 404 over time. Consistent with these findings and the existence of 
learning curve under section 404 (see Part 5 below), Alexander et al. (2013) report that 
the number of years of section 404(b) compliance, SEC’s management guidance and 
PCAOB AS 5 are associated with perceived net benefits. 
These findings are also consistent with findings in an interview-based study of 
corporate directors reported in Cohen et al. (2013).  The surveyed directors report that 
SOX had a positive impact on the empowerment and authority of the audit committee and 
in the responsibilities and status of internal auditors.  Directors cautioned that the benefits 
were tempered by a possible overreaction to SOX driven by perceived increase litigation 
risk. They also expressed concern that a compliance focus comes at the cost of 
appropriate risk management. 
More broadly, a survey by the Financial Executives Research Foundation in 2005 
(FERF 2005) found that 83% of large company CFOs agreed that SOX had increased 
investor confidence, and 33% agreed it had reduced fraud.  In a 2009 survey conducted 24 
by the SEC (SEC 2009) of 2,907 firms, with a response rate of 35%, which is high for 
such a large survey of businesses, 27% agreed that SOX had enhanced investor 
confidence, but interestingly, an even higher 40% agreed that SOX had made the 
respondents more confident in other companies’ financial reporting.   
In 2010, a Center for Audit Quality survey (n=1001) (CAQ 2010) of investors 
reported that 65% were “concerned” about the permanent exemption of $75 million and 
under public companies from SOX section 404, and in a 2012 Protiviti survey of public 
companies with more than one full year of SEC filings, 50% believed that SOX’s benefits 
outweighed or were equivalent to its costs, 47% did not think that small public companies 
should be exempt from SOX section 404(b), and 62% did not believe section 404(b) 
should be eliminated for companies under $1 billion in market capitalization.   
Finally, the GAO (2013) surveyed 746 public companies with a response rate of 
25%, specifically focused on SOX section 404.  On the one hand, the GAO reported that 
80% of all companies viewed auditor attestation under section 404(b) as “benefiting” the 
quality of the company’s controls, 53% viewed the requirement as benefiting their 
company’s financial reporting, 46% viewed their ability to prevent and detect fraud as 
benefiting from section 404(b), and 52% reported greater confidence in the financial 
reports of other section 404(b)-compliant companies.  On the other hand, only 30% 
reported that section 404(b) raised investor confidence in their own company, and only 
16% believed that section 404(b) increased their company’s ability to raise capital. 
In sum, contrary to vehement criticism of SOX in some media reports and analyses 
by political entrepreneurs (and politically active academics), the reception of SOX among 
the constituencies most affected by SOX has been far more nuanced, even receptive, 25 
consistent with Langevoort (2007)’s speculation that market and other incentives would 
blunt managerial hostility to the Act.   
 
5  Evidence on SOX’s costs 
We turn now to “hard” evidence on the costs of SOX.   These costs include direct 
costs, such as expenditures on IC systems or litigation, and indirect costs, such as those 
that may have arisen from SOX’s effects on risk-taking, investments, and other activities.  
We consider which elements of SOX have contributed to these costs, and assess how well 
research has been able to attribute the observed effects directly to SOX, as opposed to 
other changes in the legal, accounting, regulatory and market environment for firms that 
occurred close in time to SOX.   
5.1 Direct costs from control system expenditures 
The direct costs include expenses for IC testing and reporting and audit fees to 
attest to IC effectiveness.  Such costs clearly increased as a result of SOX, but how much 
remains unclear.  The SEC had estimated a cost of $91,000 per filer for internal section 
404(a) compliance, but did not have a basis for estimating the costs of auditor attestation 
under section 404(b) (SEC 2004).
6  Estimates of direct costs of SOX are largely derived 
                                                 
6 Some have criticized the SEC for supposedly grossly underestimating the costs of SOX section 404.  E.g., 
Sarbanes-Oxley 404: Will the SEC’s and PCAOB’s New Standards Lower Compliance Costs for Small 
Companies?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Hal S. Scott, 
Dir. of Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation) (“The agency’s estimate is now known to be have been off by 
a factor of 48.”); Statement of Hon. Patrick T. McHenry, in A Balancing Act:  Cost,  Compliance and 
Competitiveness after Sarbanes-Oxley, Hearing 109-217 (June 19, 2006) at 2 (same).  However, these 
criticisms mis-describe the SEC’s analysis, which estimated the internal cost of producing a control report 
satisfying section 404(a), and not the external cost of obtaining an attestation from a company’s auditors on 
a company’s control report, as required by section 404(b).  SEC 2004 at V.B and note 174 (“The estimate 
does not include the costs of the auditor’s attestation report, which many commenters have suggested might 
be substantial.”)  On the latter cost, the SEC simply noted that it did not have adequate information publish 
an informed estimate.   26 
from surveys, but these surveys do not use the same methods or samples, and rely on 
subjective and potentially biased assessments by respondents on items such as time spent 
by management overseeing compliance changes.  Despite their uncertainties, such 
surveys do indicate that SOX’s costs were and remain increasing in firm size, but at a 
decreasing rate, so that larger firms pay less for SOX-related services as a percentage of 
firm size than do smaller firms (Coates 2007; Cox 2013). 
Direct costs have also been steadily falling over time for all firms.  Charles River 
Associates estimated, for example, that Fortune 1000 firms spent $5.9 million, on 
average, to comply with section 404 in the first year of implementation (CRA 2005).  By 
the second year, however, similar surveys estimated total direct costs had fallen by 
between 15% and 40% and varied significantly by size of firm (see Coates 2007:107).  
Subsequent surveys show further drops of ~25% following the 2007 revisions to section 
404’s implementation by the PCAOB, with the result that by 2012, firms with less than 
market capitalization of $10 billion were paying an average of $350,000 for section 404 
attestation, representing ~30% of total audit fees (SEC, 2009; GAO, 2013). The SEC 
survey sample in Alexander et al. (2013) showed an overall average section 404 
compliance expense of $1.2 million in the latest fiscal year before the survey (Dec. 2008-
Jan. 2009) and respondents reported a decline over time in such costs.  
For at least four reasons, comparisons of audit fees and/or internal costs before 
and shortly after SOX are likely to exaggerate SOX’s actual long-term direct costs.  First, 
they fail to take into account the fact that audit fees were rising prior to SOX (Asthana, 
Balsam and Kim 2009), and would likely have continued to rise as a result of the 
financial failures that led to SOX, so that some costs attributed to section 404 would have 27 
been incurred without SOX.  Second, they fail to reflect the fact that firms were already 
required prior to SOX to have effective IC systems, as noted above, but many did not, so 
some costs attributed to SOX should instead be attributed to firms “catching up” on their 
legal obligations in an environment of increased enforcement. Third, in the immediate 
post-SOX period companies and audit firms were learning rapidly how to better assess 
and report on their IC systems, resulting in start-up costs and fixed investments with a 
long potential payoff period being wrongly identified as recurring annual costs. Fourth, 
they do not reflect the significant cost-saving revisions to the implementation SOX 
section 404(b) by PCAOB in 2007, discussed above.   
To partly address the first two of these issues, Iliev (2010) provides a nicely designed 
empirical estimate of direct costs of section 404 implementation using a regression 
discontinuity design, examining the increase post-SOX in audit fees above and below the 
“small firm” exemption from section 404 for firms with a market capitalization of $75 
million or less.  He finds that – for small firms just above or below the $75 million cut-
off, filing a control effectiveness report under section 404(a) in 2004 increased audit fees 
(due to the attestation requirement in section 404(b)) by 86%, or roughly $528,000 for the 
mean firm with a market capitalization of ~$135 million.  However, as reflected in 
Figure 5, his findings by design cannot be generalized to the larger firms that are the 
majority of companies subject to SOX and on which greater SEC scrutiny was brought 
post-SOX (as discussed below).  In addition, his research design does not address the 
second two issues reviewed above.  Survey results from more recent periods are likely a 
better approximation of long run, equilibrium direct costs of SOX, and, as noted above, 
on average they are much lower than Iliev’s small-firm estimate.   28 
- Insert Figure 5 about here - 
 
5.2  Direct costs from securities litigation related to SOX 
Another type of direct cost predicted to result from SOX is litigation-related costs.  
Lawsuits brought under US securities laws might have become easier to pursue (or use to 
extract settlements) as a result of SOX sections 302 and 404, which together force more 
disclosures that may be used by plaintiffs and their lawyers to identify defendants and to 
present in court as evidence of fraud.  Critics expected that SOX would generate more 
litigation – indeed, some went so far as to predict an explosion of litigation as a result of 
SOX, which they called a “litigation time bomb” (Butler & Ribstein 2006).  There was 
also concern about higher litigation risk for independent directors due to greater 
responsibilities under SOX especially for audit committee directors (Bebchuk et al 2006). 
Securities litigation incidence did rise from 2002 to 2004 following SOX (see 
Figure 6, Panel A).  However, it dropped to pre-SOX levels soon thereafter, with no 
subsequent change in law that could account for the drop.  Similarly, litigation risk for 
independent directors spiked in 2002, but then reverted to pre-SOX levels. Brochet and 
Srinivasan (2013) examine litigation risk for independent directors and document no 
increase over time in such risk (see Figure 6).  
-  Insert Figure 6 here  - 
Settlements amount also increased in the period 2004-2006 (see Figure 6, Panel B). 
Likely reflecting this proximate trend, director and officer insurance premiums increased 
substantially. Linck, Netter and Yang (2009) found that median D&O insurance 
premiums increased by more than 150% from 2001 to 2004. However, this evidence is 29 
restricted to a small sample of firms, since D&O insurance is only required to be reported 
for firms incorporated in New York state. However, with no change in the underlying 
law, securities litigation settlements began to plummet in 2007, and have remained steady 
at relatively low, pre-SOX levels since 2008.  This pattern is not consistent with SOX 
creating a powerful array of litigation tools for shareholders to sue companies or their 
managers, or for plaintiffs’ lawyers to use on behalf of shareholders in class actions.   
Instead, the pattern is more consistent with large costs arising from the fundamental 
corporate misconduct that gave rise to SOX, followed by a reduction in that misconduct 
(at least as perceived by litigants and other participants in the legal system).  This pattern 
holds even after taking account of three of the largest all-time settlements (Enron, 
Worldcom, and Tyco).  Whatever the costs of SOX, increased litigation does not appear 
to be one of them.   
5.3  Indirect costs of SOX 
In addition to (and likely more important than) the direct costs discussed above, 
SOX also imposed indirect costs on firms.  While direct costs can be significant, 
especially for small firms, indirect costs can be large for all firms if managers and boards 
of directors lowered investments and risk-taking due to fear of the increase in director 
and officer liability and/or due to distraction from core business concerns by the 
increased focus on internal controls. Alan Greenspan noted in 2003 that “business leaders 
have been quite circumspect about embarking on major new investment projects.” 
(Greenspan 2003)  Echoing similar concerns, William Donaldson, former chairman of the 
SEC predicted that SOX would lead to a “loss of risk-taking zeal” and has created a 30 
“huge preoccupation with the dangers and risks of making the slightest mistake.” 
(Michaels 2003)  
    Some studies have attempted to back up these claims with detailed findings.   
Kang, Liu and Qi (2010) find that the investment to capital ratio declined for US firms 
compared to a sample of UK firms after 2002. This evidence is corroborated by 
Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2010) who find several measures of risk taking decline for 
US firms compared to a sample of publicly listed UK and Canadian firms over the period 
1994 through 2006.  Similar to the trends observed in Figure 7 (from Albuquerque and 
Zhu, 2013), they find that US firms reduced their investment in capital and R&D 
expenditures, increased their cash holdings and reduced leverage over this time period. 
Standard deviation of stock returns for US firms also fell compared to non-US firms. 
These changes are greater for larger firms compared to smaller ones.  
-   Insert Figure 7 here – 
However, as with the decline in US IPOs depicted above, Figure 7 shows that the 
trends in investments and cash holdings manifested before SOX.  In fact, Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz (2009) document a trend of increasing levels of cash holdings and lower 
leverage for US firms starting early 1980s. Albuquerque and Zhu (2013) contest the 
findings of SOX driven lower investments using a regression discontinuity design similar 
to Iliev (2010). They compare firms that were just above and below the threshold of $ 75 
Million in market capitalization for section 404 implementation. They find that 
investment declines post-SOX for small firms subject to section 404. However, they find 
a similar decline in investment for the companies not subject to section 404, suggesting 31 
an overall decline in investment in US companies.  As shown in Figure 7, they find that 
the decline begins in 1999 or even earlier and not in 2003, when SOX went into effect.  
In other words, comparisons with the UK and Canada in Kang et al. (2010) and 
Bargeron et al. (2010) likely capture a trend of declining investment in the US, but one 
that is unrelated to SOX.  Indirect costs remain possible side effects of SOX, but their 
size and significance remain unclear. 
 
6 Evidence on SOX’s benefits 
Next we survey the evidence on the benefits of SOX. 
6.1 Impact on accounting quality 
A number of papers provide evidence consistent with the observation that 
accounting quality improved for US firms in the post-2002 time period.  Cohen, Dey, Lys 
(2008) find that accrual based earnings management increases steadily from 1987 till 
2002, then declined significantly. Some part of this decline has been offset by an increase 
in real earnings management (as measured by abnormal cash from operation, abnormal 
production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses), which had been declining prior 
to SOX. Likewise, firms that just met earnings benchmarks used less accrual and more 
real earnings management post-SOX compared to similar firms before SOX 
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007; Lobo and Zhou 2006).  
Despite the offset in higher real earnings management, however, other studies 
suggest a general improvement in accounting quality.  Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 
(2008) and Bartov and Cohen (2009) find that firms exhibited a lower tendency to engage 
in the phenomenon of just meeting or beating analysts’ consensus forecasts by managing 32 
earnings.  Lobo and Zhou (2006) document a significant increase in timely loss 
recognition, a measure of how quickly accounting incorporate economic losses.  Daniel, 
Denis and Naveen (2008) find that firms manage earnings less for dividend payout 
reasons.  Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) find that auditors greatly increased their role 
in detecting and reporting fraud in public companies after SOX, relative to other sources 
of fraud detection, from 6% of total frauds to 24% in the post-SOX period.  This increase 
is spread across not only restatement cases, but also those not involving restatements. 
Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2013) find that prior to 2002, companies were more likely to 
copy poor accounting practices (that lead to a restatement) upon observing restatements 
by industry peers. This behavior appears to have stopped after 2002, which the authors 
conjecture is driven by more rigorous enforcement after SOX.  
Further, some evidence suggests these improvements may be driven by a 
combination of SOX and changing behavior in stock markets and inside boardrooms. 
Brochet (2010) finds that insider trading disclosures became more informative after SOX. 
CEO and CFO certifications seem to have helped as well.  Qian, Strahan and Zhu (2013) 
find that firms with public floats above the trigger for SOX section 404 ($75 million) but 
below $350 million reduced CEO compensation but increased insider ownership, while 
firms below $75 million increased CEO pay and did not increase insider ownership in the 
post-SOX period. Stock market premium to meeting analysts’ consensus forecasts 
disappeared post-2002 according to Koh et al. (2008). In fact, post-2002, stock prices 
react negatively to positive earnings surprises by firms the CEOs of which have higher 
equity incentives. Similarly, Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010) find that CEO equity 
incentives, considered a culprit in providing perverse earning management incentives to 33 
managers to artificially boost stock prices, are not related to proxies for earnings 
management post-SOX in contrast to the pre-SOX time period. They find that neither 
CEO nor CFO equity incentives are positively related to magnitude of accruals during 
2002-2006 period in contrast to the prior period – 1993-2001. In fact, the relationship of 
accruals to CFO incentives reverses – higher incentives are associated with a lower 
magnitude of accruals. Boards seem to take the apparently improved managerial behavior 
into account when setting pay - sensitivity of bonus pay to accounting performance 
becomes higher as documented in Carter, Lynch, Zechman (2009). They also find that 
firms place more weight on positive earnings changes post-SOX and that firms with the 
largest decrease in positive discretionary accruals have the largest increase in weight on 
earnings changes. Significant increase in sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to 
accounting performance suggests that boards trust accounting numbers more. 
One of the precursors to SOX was the steady rise in restatements prior to 2002.  
After SOX, the number of restatements initially increased dramatically, the increase is 
mostly attributed to the increased vigilance post-SOX. The rate of restatements fell as 
dramatically as they rose (Figure 8, Panel A).  On average, restatements have been less 
egregious after SOX as seen in lower dollar amounts, more unintentional errors, more 
noncore accounts, and a lower average negative market reaction to restatement 
announcements after controlling for the lesser intensity (Burks 2010; Burks 2011; Hennes 
et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2010; Scholz 2008).  Finally, the extent of adverse SOX 
section 404 auditor attestation opinions (as a fraction of all companies to which section 
404 applies) has been declining over time, ranging from a high of 16.9 percent in 2005 
when the mandates first kicked in to 2.4 percent in 2010 (see Figure 8, Panel B). 34 
The main weakness of these streams of research on SOX’s benefits (as with 
studies of SOX’s costs, discussed above) is that while the effects documented are for the 
time period following SOX, the accounting quality benefits found in this literature may 
not have been caused by SOX itself.  Critics can validly claim that several benefits could 
have arisen from market discipline following a period where internal controls were 
widely seen to have collapsed.  Research designed to isolate the effects of SOX is 
challenging since the Act affected all large SEC registered firms in the US, depriving 
researchers of a control group of firms that was unaffected by SOX and yet comparable 
to the majority of US public companies.  Several contemporaneous changes such as 
changes in stock exchange guidelines provide alternate explanations for the observed 
effects.  Finally, SOX has several complementary provisions making it difficult to 
identify the provisions that contributed to the changes in observed behavior.   
6.2 Impact of Section 404 disclosures 
Other research more directly documents the benefits of SOX using information in 
SOX-driven disclosures. IC weakness reports mandated by SOX have proved informative 
to investors.  Firms with IC weaknesses have accruals that do not map well into cash 
flows, more auditor resignations, more restatements and SEC enforcement actions, 
provide less precise management forecasts, and CFOs with weaker qualifications (Doyle 
et al., 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Feng, Li, McVay., 2009; Li, Sun, Ettredge., 
2010). Not surprisingly, investors react negatively to disclosure of IC weakness reports 
increasing both the cost of debt (Kim, Song, and Zhang, 2011) and of equity 
(Hammersley et al., 2007).  Lenders are seen to modify debt contracts to rely less on 
financial numbers in covenants when firms disclose IC weaknesses and instead substitute 35 
them with price, security and credit rating based protection (Costello and Wittenberg-
Moerman, 2011).  Because such studies link changes in behavior to specific requirements 
in the Act, they more plausibly reflect causation, rather than temporal correlation, but 
they also leave a greater gap between the results and a quantitative assessment of the 
value of the benefits. 
While the IC disclosure mandate in section 404 has come in for the most criticism 
for the costs imposed on companies, better controls have been found to be helpful in 
improving accounting quality. Using a sample of banks unrelated to SOX, Altamuro and 
Beatty (2010) find that rules adopted in 1992 requiring internal control reporting for 
banks led to greater validity of loan loss provisions in banks. The association between 
loan-loss provisions and actual loans written off strengthened after the law was passed, 
and IC reporting led to greater earnings persistence, better ability of earnings to predict 
cash flows, and reduction in use of earnings management to report positive earnings 
growth but also to lower earnings conservatism. They conclude that banks exercised less 
reporting discretion after IC reporting was introduced. Not surprisingly, Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. (2008) find that earnings’ properties improve after remediation of ineffective 
internal controls. Remediation involves changes to management and boards and leads to 
hiring of better-qualified CFOs. (Li, Sun and Ettredge 2010; Johnstone, Li and Rupley 
2011). Firms also improve their investment efficiency after remediation of IC weaknesses 
(Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Zhang 2013). 
The implementation schedule of section 404 reporting allowed for studies that can 
produce more compelling evidence of causal effects, at least over certain subsets of firms.  
Evidence from such studies reinforces the view that section 404 causally improved 36 
accounting quality.  Iliev (2010) finds that section 404 filers just above the $75 million 
exemption from section 404 had significantly lower accruals and discretionary accruals in 
2004 compared to firms just below the implementation threshold, which he interprets as 
more conservative reporting.  Arping and Sautner (2013) find a reduction in analyst 
forecast error and forecast dispersion for European firms listed in the US and subject to 
SOX more than for matched foreign firms not cross-listed in the US.  These results are 
driven by the time period when foreign firms were required to comply with provisions of 
section 404 (after 2006 and not before). 
6.3 Impact of SOX on audit quality 
Accounting quality likely also improved because of improvements in audit 
quality. DeFond and Lennox (2011) find that, post-SOX, a number of small audit firms 
exited the market for public company audits. Roughly half (607) of 1233 small audit 
firms (small firms being defined as those with fewer than 100 SEC clients) exited the 
public audit market following SOX. Small auditors comprise 97% of all audit firms and 
audit 34% of public companies. Clients move to other smaller auditors – with remaining 
small auditors doubling their average client base – but compared to the non-exiting 
auditors, the exiting auditors are lower quality. Clients of exiting auditors receive higher 
quality auditing from successor auditors, and successor auditors are more likely than 
exiting auditors to issue going concern opinions to the new clients. The authors conclude 
that PCAOB inspections under SOX improve audit quality by incentivizing low quality 
auditors to exit the market. Raghunadan and Rama (2006) document a significant 
increase (74 to 86 percent) in audit fees after SOX consistent with both a rise in audit 
effort and increased work load attributable to SOX 404 implementation. Griffin and Lont 37 
(2007) show that this increase reflected higher audit risk suggesting that SOX increased 
the auditors share of risk of defective financial statements. (See also Defond and Zhang 
(2013) for a review of audit research that focuses on SOX.)  PCAOB inspections appear 
to have played a role in improving audit quality. DeFond and Lennox (2011) attribute the 
exit of smaller and lower quality audit firms to the threat of PCAOB inspections. Abbot, 
Gunny, and Zhang (2011) find useful information content in PCAOB inspections - 
smaller auditors that receive adverse PCAOB inspection reports have clients with 
accounting restatements and poor accrual quality. However, inspection reports are not 
found to lead to auditor switching by clients suggesting that clients do not find the 
inspection information useful in selecting auditors (Lennox and Pittman 2010). PCAOB 
sanctions against auditors are seen to be informative to investors and prompt audit firms 
to improve audit quality. Dee, Lulseged, and Zhang (2011) examine PCAOB’s 2007 
sanction of Deloitte for an audit failure in 2004 that revealed quality control problems at 
Deloitte at its local San Diego office as well as nationally.  They find that Deloitte clients 
suffered a negative 0.83 percent three day return surrounding the announcement of the 
sanction which the authors attribute the quality control problems identified at Deloitte, 
which undertook governance changes to strengthen oversight of its partners and directors.  
 
7   Event studies of net shareholder wealth effects 
The above combination of evidence on costs and benefits of SOX is hard to bring 
down to a single bottom line.  Some of the direct costs can be reduced to dollars, but 
there is substantial variation across firms and over time even in those costs.  Other direct 38 
costs, and all of the benefits and indirect costs, are not easily translated into bottom-line 
dollar costs.  As a result, the costs and benefits cannot be totaled into a single net effect.   
Partly because of these limitations, some scholars have attempted to use a single 
method to estimate both costs and benefits.  These studies have looked to stock market 
reactions to critical events in the legislative process leading up to the enactment of SOX 
and test market reaction around these events.  Unfortunately, these studies have proven 
no more useful in resolving the policy assessment of SOX, producing widely disparate 
results and remaining subject to significant uncertainties. 
On the one hand, Zhang (2007) finds that stock prices decline in response to 
events leading up to the passage of SOX.  Firms with weaker shareholder rights, higher 
pre-SOX non-audit fees, more extensive foreign operations and larger abnormal accruals 
experienced greater negative returns. On the other hand, Jain and Rezaee (2006), Li, 
Pincus, and Rego (2008); Akhigbe and Martin (2006) document that stock prices react 
favorably to the events leading up to the passage of SOX. Stock prices react favorably for 
firms with higher levels of pre-SOX governance, those with more reliable accounting, 
and higher quality audit.  There is a positive relationship of returns with extent of 
earnings management and a positive stock price impact for financial services firms except 
for securities firms.  
Again, the staggered implementation of section 404 provides the best opportunity 
to find an effect most directly attributable to SOX. Iliev (2010) finds that non-accelerated 
filers experience positive returns when the section 404 compliance deadline was 
extended. This implies that investors respond as if the costs outweigh the benefits. While 
these results are able to capture the net effect of the law, the findings are limited to 39 
relatively small firms that qualified for the extended compliance deadline, and are not 
valid as estimate of the overall effect of SOX on public firms generally.  In addition, this 
paper and the other event studies noted above use different sets of events and present 
different and somewhat subjective interpretations of whether given events improving or 
reducing the odds of SOX’s passage.
7   
Leuz (2007) identifies a number of non-SOX related negative news events on the 
dates identified in Zhang (2007) (e.g., declaration of Iraq war) that make it hard to 
identify SOX as the cause of the market reactions studied.  More generally, event study 
methods are better suited for clearly defined events and not events that depend upon the 
opaque process of legislation.  Finally, implementation of SOX took place over time, and 
(as described above) involved several decisions that were not easily foreseeable at the 
time of SOX’s adoption – including PCAOB’s 2007 changes in section 404’s 
implementation and the deferral and eventual exemption of small issuers altogether from 
section 404 – making it difficult for the market to assess how the changes would unfold. 
 
8  Other research relevant to evaluating SOX 
8.1  Ban on consulting services by audit firms 
Accounting literature has consistently diverged from the views of policy makers 
and found scant evidence that non-audit fees adversely affect financial reporting quality.  
For example, DeFond et al. (2002), Chung and Kallapur (2003), Ashbaugh et al. (2003), 
                                                 
7 Some papers provide event study evidence on CEO/CFO certification requirement in Section 302 of SOX, 
again with mixed evidence.  Griffin and Lont (2005) find that the certification event is value relevant 
whereas Bhattacharya, Groznik, and Haslem (2007) find that the certification was a non-event for certifiers 
around their certification date. Again differing methodologies in these papers do not allow for 
reconciliation of these results.  40 
Kinney et al. (2004) and Koh et al. (2012) all find no effect of non-audit fees on financial 
reporting quality).  Indeed, by banning such services, SOX has made further study 
difficult due to the elimination of observed variation in practice. 
8.2  Role of SEC enforcement 
SOX expanded SEC resources and gave the SEC more legal tools, but the political 
environment as it relates to fraud shifted concurrently with SOX, making it possible that 
SEC priorities would have shifted without regard to SOX.
8   Descriptive evidence 
suggests that the SEC brought more accounting and auditing enforcement cases and 
pursued larger companies in the aftermath of the scandals in 2002, which was no doubt 
supported by the increased budget (see Table 1).  The median size of company that is the 
subject of an accounting and auditing enforcement release (AAER) shows a clear upward 
movement from the pre-2002 to the post-2004 time period. Note that Table 1 presents 
data as of the AAER issuance date, which is typically well after the fraud occurred. We 
observe a similar pattern (untabulated) when we consider when the fraud actually 
occurred.  
-  Insert Table 1 here  - 
Consistent with these descriptive data, Cox and Thomas (2005) find that the SEC 
appears to be targeting much larger companies in the post-2002 period that it did from 
1990-2002. They document that the average (median) market capitalization for SEC 
                                                 
8 There is limited research on the role of SEC enforcement on improving accounting quality in companies.  
One notable exception is Kedia and Rajgopal (2011). They find that firms located closer to SEC offices and 
in areas with higher prior SEC enforcement activity are less likely to restate their financials. Moreover, the 
SEC is more likely to investigate firms located closer to its offices. However, Jennings, Kedia, and 
Rajgopal (2013) find that the deterrence effect of SEC enforcement actions is not reflected in improved 
earnings quality at peer firms as measured by abnormal accruals, earnings response coefficients or timely 
loss recognition.  41 
enforcement targets was 23 (13) times bigger post-2002. Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 
(2010) find that the SEC became more likely to be the first detector of corporate frauds 
after SOX, increasing its share of total fraud detection (relative to other actors) from 5% 
to 10%. 
The pattern observed Table 1 and by Cox and Thomas (2005) could occur if the type 
of firms committing fraud has changed over time, with larger firms being prone to 
commit fraud now than before. Anginer et al. (2012) address this issue by examining 
firms that presented evidence of options backdating based on suspicious timing of option 
grants on dates where the stock price was at its lowest. Based on this sample of all 
potential backdating cases, they find that smaller firms were more likely to indulge in the 
practice than larger firms.  However, they find that larger firms were more likely to be 
prosecuted by the SEC and DOJ.  The effect of changing enforcement priorities on 
propensity to commit fraud in particular and on accounting quality in general is an open 
issue, and remains an unexplored potential consequence of (and/or confound for) SOX. 
For example, Section 408 of SOX required the SEC to review periodic financial 
statements of companies at least once every three years, representing a major step up 
from then existing review practice. The resulting publicly available comment letters 
present a rich source of data on financial reporting issues and a potential area for 
research. 
8.3  Role of boards and audit committees 
Section 301 of SOX required that the audit committee be comprised exclusively 
of independent directors and charged the audit committee with direct responsibility for 
the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the auditor. There is a preponderance of 42 
evidence (from mainly association studies) that more independent audit committees 
demand better audit quality and are associated with better financial reporting quality 
(e.g., Klein 2002; Abbott, Parker, Peters 2004). The previously discussed evidence on 
improvement in accounting quality post-SOX is consistent with improved monitoring by 
audit committees, though direct evidence of SOX mandates on audit committee 
independence contributing to this effect is lacking.  
Section 407 of SOX required firms to comply with the requirement to have at 
least one audit committee financial expert, or explain why they did not, leading to the 
question of the role financial experts play in improving financial reporting.  Defond, 
Hann, and Hu (2005) examine 3-day market reaction around director appointments to the 
board pre-SOX (1993-2002) and find a positive reaction to appointment announcement 
for accounting financial experts but no reaction to non-accounting financial experts or 
non-financial directors, suggesting that the market places a positive value on accounting 
experts. They document a positive reaction even if the board had a prior financial expert. 
The paper finds weak evidence that the market responds to expectations of better 
monitoring than the signal of quality when an expert joins the board.  Accounting experts 
on the audit committee, in particular, improve accounting quality. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) 
find that audit committee accounting expertise is positively associated with accruals 
quality for audit committee accounting experts with lower tenure and fewer other 
directorships. Several papers use board changes prompted by changes in stock exchange 
listing requirements to examine the impact of board characteristics on a variety of firm 
outcomes. While interesting, we do not discuss these papers as they do not directly relate 
to the effect of SOX itself, which changed the requirements only for audit committees.  43 
 8.4  Effect of SOX on governance and transparency generally 
Hochberg et al. (2009) use an innovative approach to study wealth effects by 
examining stock market reaction for firms that lobby for or against the provisions of 
SOX. Greater returns to firms that lobby against strict implementation of SOX suggest 
SOX had a positive impact on corporate transparency and governance. Further they find 
that firms with corporate insiders that oppose strict SOX related rules are larger, are more 
profitable, have lower future growth opportunities, and retain more cash, all 
characteristics of free cash flow or agency problems. These firms experience higher 
cumulative abnormal returns during the SOX passage period relative to peer firms that 
choose not to lobby. These cumulative returns do not reverse themselves following the 
passage of SOX. 
8.5 Auditor  performance  in the financial crisis 
A last set of studies bears on how well auditors performed in the financial crisis, 
as one measure of whether SOX accomplished the goal of improving accounting and 
auditing.  By that measure, the results are mixed.  On the one hand, within a short time of 
receiving clean audit reports (and section 404 control attestations) from their auditors, 
many financial institutions failed in contexts calling into question their prior accounting.  
As reviewed in Sikka (2009), Bear Stearns received a clean report from Deloitte on 
January 28, and failed on March 14; Thornburg received a clean report from KPMG on 
February 27, which was withdrawn on March 4 prior to Thornburg’s failure; Northern 
Rock received a clean report on July 25, only to suffer a bank run on September 14; and 
US Bancorp received a clean report from E&Y on February 20 before receiving $6 
billion in bail-out funds on November 14.  As detailed by a bankruptcy court examiner 44 
(Valukas (2010)), E&Y “were aware of but did not question Lehman’s use and 
nondisclosure” of “window-dressing” repo transactions to “manage” its balance sheet 
around period ends,
9 to make it appear that it was smaller and less leveraged than it was, 
leading the examiner to conclude there was “sufficient credible evidence to support a 
finding by a trier of fact” that E&Y had failed to meet professional auditing standards. 
Consistent with these examples, Desai, Rajgopal, and Yu (2013) find large sample 
evidence that auditors showed no ability to assess bank risk and predict weaknesses in the 
lead up to the financial crisis in contrast to the ability of short sellers to do the same.  
On the other hand, a few studies suggest that some of the goals of SOX improved 
financial institutions in the crisis.  Yeh et al. (2011) find in a cross-country study that 
banks with fully independent audit committees prior to the crisis performed better, 
measured by total return to shareholders and return on equity during both 2007 and 2008.  
Jin et al. (2011) found that among small and mid-sized US banks, those with auditors that 
specialized in banking in 2006 were less likely to fail in the crisis (i.e., 2007 to 2009). 
Doogar, Rowe, and Sivadasan (2013) show that audit firms increased fees charged to 
their banking clients to reflect the changing risk profile of their loan portfolios and 
securitization risk over the time period from 2005 to 2007, suggesting that audit firms 
recognized client risk and priced their services accordingly. The authors attribute the 
failure by audit firms to provide advance warning of client failure to limitations in the 
auditor’s report and the scope of the auditors disclosure requirements rather than to a 
failure of assess client risk.  Together, the evidence suggests that better auditing and more 
                                                 
9 On bank holding company window-dressing in the crisis generally, see Owens and Wu (2012). 45 
independent auditors did help alleviate the worst effects of the crisis, even if SOX, 
PCAOB and audit firms performed well below the ideal. 
9  A research agenda:  SOX and beyond 
Drawing on the prior sections, we develop a research agenda that better grapples 
with difficulties of measuring the full set of costs and benefits caused by and not merely 
correlated with new financial regulations, such as SOX.  To accomplish this general goal, 
multiple new research tasks must be engaged, including better estimates of fraud, new 
models and data on the externalities of fraud, new and better instruments for estimating 
causal effects of anti-fraud regulation, and better models and data on the chilling effects 
that financial regulation may have on legitimate activity.  Each task will be difficult, and 
each will likely require a separate stream of research – both theoretical and empirical – 
before any plausible aggregate estimate of the benefits of any major piece of financial 
regulation can be developed.  While these tasks are being undertaken, regulation will 
continue to be produced, modified, and criticized by political actors, and we conclude 
with speculative suggestions on how policymakers might improve on financial regulation 
from a cost-benefit perspective without waiting on a fully realized research agenda. 
9.1  Estimating the incidence of fraud and its direct costs 
The first task is to develop better methods of simply measuring the incidence of 
fraud and its costs.  This task is a necessary prerequisite before we can even roughly 
estimate the effect of regulation aimed at reducing fraud.  Many papers link fraud to 
equity compensation for executives (e.g., Burns and Kedia (2006) and Johnson, Ryan 
and Tian (2009)) and non-independent or inexpert corporate boards (e.g., Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005)). Khanna et al. (2013) link fraud to CEO connectedness to other same-46 
firm executives and directors.  Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) find that multiple 
monitoring agents play a role in detecting major corporate frauds, including auditors, 
analysts, and the SEC, but also newspapers, employees, and non-financial regulators. 
Other papers examine whether general measures of investor mood or beliefs are related to 
the overall incidence of fraud.
10 For the most part, however, these studies only attempt to 
establish that relationships between incentives, monitoring agents or investor beliefs 
exist, and do not convincingly identify causality or present evidence of how strong these 
relationships are, or what the overall incidence of corporate fraud is. 
One difficulty confronting such studies is that in observational or quasi-
experiments set in the real world, the difficulty is that all concerned have incentives to 
hide fraud.
11   Fraud is already subject to criminal and multiple civil penalties if 
discovered, so fraudsters have strong incentives to hide their activities.  As with crime 
generally, regulators and enforcement officials, too, have at least some incentives to 
suggest that the incidence of undiscovered fraud is lower than it may actually be, since a 
large stock of undiscovered fraud might be used to attack their efficacy.  Victims have 
incentives both to over-report fraud (in the wake of poor investment decisions, for 
example), but also to under-report it (because there are social and psychological costs to 
acknowledging that one has been duped).  Lev (2003), who reviews large sample studies 
                                                 
10 For example, Hertzberg (2005) and Povel, Singh, and Winton (2007) develop theories about whether and 
how the incidence of fraud should relate to investor optimism about business conditions.  Hertzberg posits a 
positive relationship; Povel et al. argue instead for an inverted U shaped relationship, peaking when 
investors believe conditions are good, but not extremely good.  Wang, Winton and Yu (2010) apply the 
Wang empirical 2010 model to a sample of IPOs to test which of these theories better fits the data, and find 
that the latter does.   
 
11 In controlled experiments, by contrast, researchers can know with much greater certainty the actual 
incidence of fraud and the effects of different “regulatory” treatments (see, e.g., Guttentag et al. (2009), 
who study the effect of disclosure on fraud incidence in such an experiment).  But the ability to generalize 
beyond such experimental research settings is unclear at best.   47 
of discontinuities in the distribution of public company earnings, deviations from 
expected accruals and patterns of earnings around suspicious circumstances, and 
concludes “this evidence suggests that the frequency of manipulations [of reported 
earnings] is substantially higher than the 100-150 litigated or SEC-enforced cases per 
year.”  As analyzed by Feinstein (1990), partial observability presents challenges to 
empirical modeling.  
Wang (2010, 2013) and Li (2013) use empirical models of both fraud incidence 
and detection that allows better inferences about the correlates of fraud (including both 
detected and undetected fraud) to be drawn from detected frauds.
12  Each exploits the 
partial overlap in indicators of both fraud incidence and fraud detection, using different 
econometric models.
13  
Building on Wang’s work, Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2013) exploit the failure of 
Arthur Andersen, which forced companies to change auditors, and on the assumption that 
new auditors would “clean house” and reveal fraud that might otherwise have been 
unrevealed.  They estimate that the probability of a public company engaging in fraud in 
any given year is 15% –  which would suggest a current stock of several hundred 
fraudulent public companies.  (They validate this measure with a survey of fraud 
observed by business school students at former employers.)  Dyck et al. 2013 estimate the 
                                                 
12 While the fraud prediction and detection models in these papers allow better assessment of fraud, 
concerns still remain about the exogeneity of the instruments used to model underlying fraud as distinct 
from detected fraud.  
13 Wang finds R&D (but not capex), abnormally low accounting or stock returns, and high stock turnover 
make fraud more likely, while fraud is less likely if a firm faces more analyst coverage; fraud detection, by 
contrast, is increased by M&A and analyst coverage, but decreased by R&D expenditures.   Li finds that 
fraud incidence is increasing in executive pay performance sensitivity and decreasing in institutional 
ownership, while fraud detection is increasing in qualified audit opinions and the SEC’s inflation-
adjusted budget per public company.   
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average corporate fraud generates losses of between 22% and 40% of enterprise value 
(equity plus long-term debt) at a fraudulent firm.  In combination, these two estimates 
(0.15 x 0.22 = 0.03) estimate an aggregate lower bound on the cost to investors in 
fraudulent firms of roughly 3% of enterprise value.  Applied to the market capitalization 
of all US public companies, this implies a total as-yet-unrevealed direct cost to investors 
of over $500 billion.  A reduction by just 1% in this incidence of fraud would generate $5 
billion of direct benefits to current investors – before accounting for the indirect costs of 
fraud (discussed below).   
Zakolyukina (2013) estimates undetected intentional earnings manipulation from 
a sample of 1,500 firms in the post-SOX period.  She finds that the probability of 
detection is only 9%, and generates a loss of 11% to the firm’s CEO wealth if detected.  
The inference she draws is that 66% of her sample have rational incentives to manipulate 
earnings, and that the value-weighted bias in stock prices across the sample firms is 16% 
– in line with the Dyck et al. estimate of the direct investor losses caused by fraud.  
Finally, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a) provide estimates of the costs borne by firms 
that engage in fraud, and their managers.  Firms that misrepresented in the pre-SOX 
period and were subject to SEC AAERs incur penalties of $24 million per firm, but lose 
7.5 times more (on a present value basis) in the form of lower sales and higher 
contracting and financing costs.  For each dollar a firm inflated its market value, it lost 
$4.08 once the misconduct is revealed –  $0.36 due to SEC penalties and $3.83 to 
reputation. Survey evidence in Dichev, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2013) suggests 
that around 20 percent of firms exploit GAAP to misrepresent reported performance in 
financial statements. 49 
These studies, while helpful in at least bounding the incidence of certain types of 
fraud, are limited in various ways, and include different factors.  Future research could 
aim at more comprehensive measures of fraud, to include not only auditor-discoverable 
fraud (studied in Dyck et al.) and earnings manipulation (studied in Lev 2003 and 
Zakolyukina 2013), but also frauds that fall outside the scope of audits, such as insider 
trading, self-dealing (as at Enron), fraud-based compensation (as at Tyco), frauds 
involving third parties (as at Worldcom) or technically GAAP-compliant but deceptive 
accounting choices (as arguably was true at Lehman). As an example, Anginer et al. 
(2012) identify suspicious options backdating activity by identifying likely opportunistic 
option grants that are made at unusually favorable exercise prices. This allows them to 
identify a sample – an upper bound – of all possible backdating cases from where they 
identify firms that were prosecuted by the SEC. At a minimum, we suggest a better 
comprehensive data collection effort by all enforcement officials, across all relevant 
regulatory agencies (SEC, CFTC, CFPB, FTC, Fed, OCC, FDIC, DOJ, FINRA, PCAOB, 
state agencies and AGs), to identify aggregate trends in the incidence of fraud.  A 
companion effort might be for the same agencies to create a single point-of-entry web-
based system for whistle-blowers, victims, and others to report suspicious or potentially 
fraudulent activity, which could provide directional if noisy data on as-yet unproven 
fraud. 
9.2  Modeling and measuring the externalities of fraud 
If more work needs to be done on models of fraud incidence, the equally 
important task of estimating the costs of fraud remains farther behind. Few researchers 
have systematically attempted to study and measure the social costs of financial frauds. 50 
Without such estimates, an assessment of a regulation that reduces fraud would remain 
qualitative.  Research particularly needs to be conducted on the extent to which fraud 
results not only in direct monetary net losses to the parties involved (the focus of Dyck et 
al. 2013, discussed above), but in both psychological costs and externalities.
14  
Psychological effects (e.g., fear, distrust, and stress) can result in tangible consequences, 
including drug addiction, job loss, reduced income, health effects, and even suicide.  In 
the context of securities fraud, Freshman (2012) finds elevated levels of post-traumatic 
stress disorder and related behavioral effects among Madoff victims. On the externalities 
of fraud, Lev (2003)’s sketch is a useful starting point for the following categories:
15   
(a)   Fraud increases the cost of capital for all firms, due to reduced quality of financial 
information and heightened expected fraud-related losses and reduced confidence 
in public securities markets and in markets more generally.
16 
                                                 
14 Fraud is criminalized in part for these reasons – direct remediable civil damages are not thought to be 
large enough to provide sufficient incentive for private actors to enforce optimally.  Shavell 1986.  But 
criminal sanctions are reserved for a small subset of frauds – those in which clear evidence is available ex 
post for frauds caused by individuals with specific intent, and the nature of fraud is such that such evidence 
is often unavailable. section 24 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes criminal liability for “willful” 
violations; see also section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (same). 
 
15 Anderson (1999) presents a similar list of indirect effects of crime generally.  He estimates the indirect 
costs – what he categorizes as “crime-induced production,” opportunity costs, and risks to life and health –
  are roughly double the value of victim-to-criminal property transfers, and when he counts the costs 
incurred by criminals, the total costs of crime is more than double the value of those transfers (Table 7).  In 
other words, the external effects of crime generally greatly exceed their direct effects.  See also Velikonja 
(2013). 
 
16  Jain, Kim and Rezaee (2008) show that market liquidity deteriorated following Enron and related 
scandals, and improved after SOX’s adoption, and Gianetta and Wang (2013) show that revelation of corporate 
frauds in a state caused equity holdings of households in that state to fall, increasing the cost of capital for non-
fraudulent firms.  For a more general study of the effect of trust on finance, see Guiso et al. 2007; see also 
Bonaccorsi di Patti 2009 (crime, including fraud, increases borrowing costs and increases capital 
constraints).   
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(b)    Fraud wastes investment caused by misallocation of resources caused by 
fraudulent signals of the value of firms or whole industries, as in the telecom and 
internet bubbles.
17 
18 
(c)   Fraud destroys value through the (costly) acquisition by fraudulent companies of 
other companies, followed by mismanagement or outright theft and bankruptcy, 
causing further transaction costs of reorganizing still-viable companies once the 
fraud is uncovered.
19 
(d)   Fraud induces increased bonding, monitoring and precautionary costs by investors 
to avoid fraud, such as for audit firms, independent directors, appraisers, analysts, 
regulatory and enforcement agencies, and prisons.
20  
(e)   Fraud imposes costs imposed on third parties that are dependent on the victims of 
the initial fraud (e.g., family, business partners, creditors and communities).
21   
                                                 
17  For a review of studies showing that corporate finance decisions driven by capital market prices, 
including prices that deviate from fundamental values (i.e., mispricing), see Baker 2009; see also Baker, 
Stine and Wurgler 2003 (modeling and presenting evidence that bubbles affect corporate investment). 
 
18  Kedia and Phillippon (2009) model investment decisions of firms during periods of fraud and find 
empirical support for their prediction that fraud and earnings management distort hiring and investment 
decisions of firms leading to over-investment and excessive hiring during periods of suspicious accounting. 
This leads to misallocation of resources in the economy.  
 
19 For a model of merger and acquisition activity driven by mispricing, see Shleifer and Vishny 2003; for 
estimates of the costs of bankruptcy, see, e.g., Bris, Welch and Zhu 2006 (estimating range from 2 to 20% 
of firm assets resulting from formal bankruptcy). 
 
20 As noted above, audit fees were rising prior to SOX, due to market-driven demand for increased scrutiny 
of financial statements following the scandals that led to SOX.  See Asthana, Balsam, and Kim 2009.  
Likewise, separate from SOX, the NYSE and the Nasdaq adopted tighter corporate governance 
requirements in response to Enron et al., which tightened the criteria for and likely increased the costs of 
recruiting independent directors.  
 
21  For studies showing spillover effects of restatements, see Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008) 
(spillovers on same-industry companies); Durnev and Mangen 2009 (same); Files and Gurun 2011 
(spillovers on competitors, customers or suppliers of the restating firm).  Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008b) 
find that of 2,206 individuals identified as responsible for a set of 788 SEC and DOJ enforcement actions 
for financial misrepresentations, 93% lost their jobs, most suffered significant financial losses, and 28% 
faced criminal charges and penalties, including prison sentences averaging 4.3 years.  Their results imply 
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For example, consider the likely size of such costs flowing from the Madoff 
scandal, which imposed significant direct losses on over 15,000 individual investors, each 
of whom presumably had an average of two dependents or heirs, and many of whom 
were co-investors and borrowers with yet others, or makers of charitable donations to 
non-profits.
22  To date, the liquidation of the Madoff entities has generated over $700 
million in expenses – all a pure loss to investors, over and above the amounts stolen by 
Madoff himself.
23  As a broader example, consider how fraudulent home loans (whether 
due to borrower fraud, lender fraud, or both) had ripple effects in the last financial 
bubble, partly generated through leverage and intermediation, so the one fraudulent loan 
would affect not only the immediate parties to the loan but also securitization lenders, 
sponsors and other related parties; collateralized debt obligation investors, sponsors and 
related parties; structured investment vehicle (SIV) investors, sponsors and related 
parties; investors in the banks that sponsored the SIVs; borrower-customers of those 
banks, whose capital constraints and heightened risk-aversion following the crisis caused 
a withdrawal or increase in the cost of credit; employees and customers of businesses that 
failed as a result of the capital constraints generated by the banks’ losses; family 
members of those employees, and so on.   
How do we translate these anecdotal examples into a more general method for 
estimating not just the losses to fraud victims, but the more general knock-on effects of 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the 788 frauds generated led to 2,656 prison-years, roughly totaling $79 million for prison costs alone, 
based on BJS (2008) data on average prison costs.  
 
22 See Picard 2013 at Exhibit A, page 5.  For charities harmed by the Madoff scandal, see Weiss and 
Birkner 2008. 
 
23 See Picard 2013 at Exhibit A, page 2. 
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fraud on society as a whole?  In the context of SOX specifically, Graham, Litan and 
Sukhtankar (2002) is an isolated effort to estimate fraud’s social costs from stock market 
price changes arguably induced by fraud.  They relate large-scale instances of fraud 
revelation (as in the period leading up to SOX) and the direct costs they impose on 
investors on the fraudulent companies to models of the role of the stock market in the 
macro-economy. The authors draw on the discussion of “shocks” to the equity premium 
in the broader analysis in Reifschneider, Tetlow and Williams (1999) of the “US/Fed 
model” used by the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve to model the US 
economy for purposes of setting monetary policy.  In another attempt to assess 
externalities from fraud, Gianetti and Wang (2013) use brokerage data of a sample of 
retail investors across the US and show that upon the revelation of fraud in a company in 
a particular state, all households in the state, not just the ones owning stocks of fraud 
firms, reduce their equity holdings. Households also decrease their ownership in all firms, 
not just the ones where fraud is revealed. Firms headquartered in the same state as a firm 
involved in fraud experience a decline in the number of shareholders, especially retail 
ones. Relatedly, same state firms also experience an increase in cost of capital and lower 
valuations. 
Graham et al. first develop a rough range of estimates of the direct costs to 
investors of the pre-SOX scandals, ranging from $10 to $23 billion, based on assuming 
that between 25% and 100% of the market decline from March 2002 to July 2002 was 
caused by those scandals.  They then combine these estimates with the US/Fed model’s 
prediction that investment would fall 0.8% per year in response to a 20% decline in stock 
market wealth, to estimate the first-year impacts of the scandals on the economy as a 54 
whole, producing social estimates of the costs of the scandal ranging from $19 billion to 
$57 billion.  Graham et al.’s estimates would understate actual costs if the impact on US 
GDP lasted for more than one year.   
For similar models of the social costs of financial crises, such as the recent one, 
see Haldane (2010) (estimating that the recent crisis caused losses of between 90% and 
350% of world GDP); De-Ramon, et al. (2012) (estimating the recent crisis caused losses 
of between 18% and 48% of UK GDP); and Posner and Weyl (2013) (estimating the 
losses at between 1% and 20% of US GDP).  As can be seen from the range of estimates 
from these studies, the models remain highly sensitive to assumptions, and produce 
highly varying results.  Even if one thinks that “ordinary” corporate fraud produces less 
dramatic effects on the financial system as a whole than was the case in the recent crisis, 
considerably more work remains to be done to be able to estimate the social costs of 
financial fraud in this way. 
Finally, research on corporate fraud could learn from research on crime generally, 
which uses several families of methods (see Ludwig 2010 and Donohue 2009 for 
overviews):  (1) “hedonic” models in which changes or variation in market prices 
affected by crime to infer social costs (e.g., Thaler 1978, Hoehn Berg and Blomquist 
1987, Viscusi 2000); (2) the use of surveys of willingness-to-pay by potential victims for 
a reduction in the odds of crime (e.g., Cohen et al. 2004; Nagin et al. 2006); 
(3) estimating each of the direct and indirect effects separately and aggregating them 
(e.g., Anderson 1999); and (4) relating responses to surveys of crime victims to 
respondent wealth or income and inferring a “shadow price” for the effects of crime (e.g., 55 
Moore and Shepherd 2006).
24   Each method has limitations and weaknesses, and is 
probably best used in combination to produce cost ranges, as in Donohue 2009. 
9.3 Estimating  causal  effects of financial regulation 
With a better framework for estimating the incidence and costs of fraud in hand, 
researchers could then better estimate the benefits of specific legal or regulatory changes, 
such as reflected in SOX.  To date, however, most studies of SOX (as reflected in our 
discussion above), have not used research designs well adapted for this purpose, and 
instead use simple before-and-after comparisons that fail to control for contemporaneous 
changes in the objects of study.  Studying such changes is much harder than rocket 
science, which after all models relatively simple inert objects moving through space, and 
not large groups of independent agents interacting in a complex regulatory and market 
environment.  Given the complexity of the task and the inevitably low power of such 
studies, we continue to need to find better quasi-experimental designs to better control 
adequately for omitted variables and identify causal effects.   
Better are difference-in-difference designs, such as those used by Kamar et al. 
2009 (studying going private), Johnson and Madura 2009 (studying going public); 
Piotorski and Srinivasan 2008 (studying foreign listings); Kang et al. 2010 and Bargeron, 
Lehn and Zutter 2010 (studying investment decisions).  Even those studies can also be 
misleading if factors affect events in the nominal control sample in a similar fashion as in 
                                                 
24 An open conceptual issue is whether to count the utility of a criminal in estimating social welfare effects 
of crime.  Assume, for example, a fraudster obtains $1 from a victim and spends it on food.  Is the direct 
social loss $0 or $1?  If the criminal’s utility is ignored and the fraud has no effect besides the transfer of 
$1, the social loss is $1.  If the criminal’s utility is counted equally with the victim’s, and neither attaches 
unusual utility to the $1, the social loss is $0.  As outlined above, such fraud generates other losses, such as 
precautionary expenditures and externalities, but the question of how to count gains or benefits to 
fraudsters remains disputed.  Compare Cook (1983) (criminals’ utility should count) with Cohen (2005) 
and Ludwig (2006) (it should not count). Anderson (1999)’s data suggests the difference is significant. 56 
the nominally “treated” sample, as seems to be true for the investment decision studies.  
Better still are discontinuity designs, used by Iliev 2010 (studying changes in audit costs 
and accounting quality); Albuquerque and Zhu (2013) (studying investment decisions), 
but the findings of such studies may not generalize beyond the immediate discontinuity in 
question.  Perhaps best of all are time-series designs studying multiple events, such as 
used by Leuz et al. 2008 (several events in the phase-in and extended exemptions for 
small firms from compliance with section 404) and Arping and Sautner 2013 (staged 
phase-in for foreign firms cross-listed in the US to comply with section 404).  But it is 
rare to find multiple, objective and independent events in legal or accounting rule-
systems with related implications.   
9.4  Modeling and measuring chilling effects of financial regulation 
Just as better causal designs are needed to study the effects of regulatory changes, 
so too are better designs for studying their costs.  This is true even of direct costs, given 
the incentives of affected companies to exaggerate those costs in public comments, and 
the fact that most regulatory burdens will have a fixed, up-front component and a smaller 
ongoing cost, and can be reduced over time as compliance technologies improve.  But the 
need is even greater with respect to indirect costs such as changes in risk-taking and 
investment, which can plausibly dwarf the direct costs in magnitude.  SOX, for example, 
is said to have caused changes in the risk of personal liability facing managers and 
directors and in the risk of reputational harms and opportunity costs created by litigation.  
If true, difficult-to-explain and legitimate business risks may be foregone, firms may 
decline to go public or otherwise avoid the burdens of the law, with resulting social costs. 
These costs are likely to affect more firms, including firms not yet created, than the out-57 
of-pocket costs of compliance at the time a law is initially adopted.  Better specification 
and measurement of indirect costs, and better causal designs to estimate their magnitudes, 
will reduce the uncertainty associated with the net effects of any given regulatory change. 
9.5    Regulatory Experiments 
The difficulty in assessing causal effects of regulation arises from our inability to 
conduct a randomized trial. As discussed earlier, the staggered implementation for 
companies of different sizes and size cut-off for Section 404 applicability have provided 
the best experimental settings for causal analysis of costs and benefits of SOX. Prior 
experience suggests a few useful approaches to improve our ability to assess costs and 
benefits with some degree of causal inference. The SEC in implementing Regulation 
SHO (regulation of short selling effective January 2005) adopted a randomized testing 
approach in allowing a temporary suspension of some short-sale restrictions (price tests) 
for a set of roughly one thousand US stocks – the “Pilot” stocks were randomly selected 
to be every third from the Russell 3000 index ranked by trading volume. Diether, Lee and 
Werner (2009) use this randomization to assess the effectiveness of price tests and find 
that the rules introduce distortions in order flow thus affecting market quality. Similar 
randomization in implementation of important rules for large enough samples can allow 
for causal inferences.  
A second approach is to allow voluntary opt-in or opt-out of regulations. While 
the voluntary nature of the opting decision introduces endogeneity concerns, this method 
allows for less costly trials since companies that find regulations costly are more likely to 
opt out. For example, Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992) examine Pennsylvania Senate Bill 
1310 that introduced sweeping anti-takeover protection but allowed companies the option 58 
to reject or retain provisions of state level anti-takeover provisions. They find an 
abnormal stock return of about negative 9 percent from introduction to enactment of the 
bill and a positive abnormal two-day return of 0.65 percent for firms that rejected all 
provisions of the bill. Manzi (2012) discusses several experiments in Welfare Reform in 
the US where individual states were allowed to opt out of federal regulations in return for 
data collection on several outcomes, which eventually led to scientific evidence on the 
efficacy of the programs.  
9.6  What to do in the meantime? 
Here we return to the fact that many costs (direct costs) are easier to observe and 
quantify (even if such estimate are likely to be overstated), while other costs 
(opportunity, risk-taking) are hard to observe and quantify, and the benefits being hardest 
to estimate of all.  This raises a methodological challenge for policy-makers:  if they are 
truly neutral on the net costs/benefits coming to the analysis, they have to implicitly 
weight the results of quantitative assessments differently, given the difference in ease of 
quantifying costs / benefits.   
One way to address this imbalance might be to develop a “multiplier” for fraud’s 
costs, and for the benefits of reducing fraud through any given regulatory change.  This 
multiplier would be similar to the multiplier used to estimate the effects of government 
spending on economic growth – with all of the controversy that the analogy suggests, 
whatever the result of the debate over the size of the multiplier, it would be better than 
either accepting zero as the implicit number for difficult-to-quantify benefits of anti-fraud 
regulation within a cost-benefit framework, or to decline to pursue quantification 59 
altogether, relying solely on faulty and politically influenced regulatory judgments of 
elected lawmakers and appointed regulatory officials.  
Alternatively, policy-makers can put together and refine but rely on admittedly 
crude assumptions such as those used by Dyck et al. 2013 and Graham et al. 2002, 
discussed above. Such methods will create ballpark estimates of the benefits of tightened 
financial regulations, which can then be used to compare to equally crude estimate of 
such regulations’ costs.  Even crude efforts at quantification of the full range of 
regulatory costs and benefits will at least focus public and policy debate on common 
questions.  Without it, result is likely to be continued polarization over financial 
regulations’ effects, and continued vacillation between excessively tight and excessively 
permissive laws. 
 
10 Conclusion 
Coming in the aftermath of several large-scale frauds in the early 2000s, SOX 
sought to empower regulators, auditors, and corporate boards to improve governance and 
reduce fraud. With the passage now of over ten years, there is substantial research on the 
consequences of the Act. We assess the impact of SOX using findings from scholarly 
research to help researchers understand the strengths and limitations of current research 
in informing about significant regulatory interventions as well as to inform regulators and 
policy makers on the design of future regulations or changes to current ones.  
We find that despite its controversial nature, the Act has survived almost intact 
since its enactment. The PCAOB has become an important part of the regulatory 
landscape having survived a high profile lawsuit that challenged its constitutionality. Our 60 
survey suggests that some of the early concerns about SOX were likely overblown. There 
is scant evidence of “federalization” of corporate law. Significant modifications to the 
implementation of SOX’s core provision relating to internal controls – section 404, have 
made it less costly to implement and hence more acceptable. 
Several studies that have estimated the direct costs of SOX (especially section 
404) implementation and find that these costs fall disproportionately on smaller firms. 
Modification to section 404 and subsequently the JOBS Act were aimed at lowering the 
cost imposed on smaller firms. In terms of indirect costs, we conclude that the evidence 
of costs is not clear cut. While several smaller firms left the public equity market and 
smaller foreign firms shunned the US as a listing venue, these firms fit the profile of 
firms more susceptible to fraud (and also reflect reversal from a higher propensity in the 
mid-1990s for smaller firms to access public equity markets). Hence, the social welfare 
implication of implicitly deterring these smaller firms from public markets is unclear. A 
more serious concern is the documented decline in investments to capital ratio in the US 
post-SOX, with implications for innovation and risk taking in the US economy. However, 
research also documents that the trend towards lower investments started prior to SOX 
and the post-SOX trend is merely a continuation of a prior pattern. We conclude that 
while there is some evidence on indirect costs, research presently has not produced robust 
evidence on the cause or the magnitude of the effect. 
Research has documented benefits in financial reporting quality after SOX. While 
there is a significant time period effect, there is less evidence on the causality. The 
staggered implementation of SOX 404 allowed researchers to produce some causal 
evidence that section 404 implementation has produced financial reporting benefits. 61 
There is also significant evidence that internal control weakness reports produced as a 
result of section 404 are valuation relevant for investors and prompt companies to make 
managerial and governance improvements. Overall, there appears to have been an 
improvement in financial reporting quality after SOX, some of which can be attributed to 
section 404.  
We conjecture that the policy opposition to SOX is driven to a large extent by the 
observable direct costs. Estimating the benefits and indirect costs are difficult tasks, made 
even harder by the difficulty of drawing causal inferences about the Act’s effects. 
Further, without a better handle on the externalities created by frauds, it is hard to assess 
costs and benefits of regulation designed to combat fraud. We make several suggestions 
in the short and long term that researchers and policy makers can adopt. The first task is 
to estimate the extent of the incidence of fraud (not just fraud that is detected) and then to 
model and measure the externalities caused by fraud. The next task would be to 
estimating the causal effects of regulation aimed at combating fraud. And the third task is 
to model and measure the negative effects of regulation. Together these tasks are 
challenging but critical to ensure policy making is well informed by research.  62 
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Figure 1: PCAOB and SEC Budgets 
 
Panel A: The figure shows the level of PCAOB budget over time (Bars) and the growth 
in PCAOB budget relative to the SEC budget              
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: The figure shows the level of the SEC budget over time. The Y-axis is in dollar 
million. 
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Figure 2: Frequency of US firms going private and going dark. 
 
The figure shows the rate of US firms going private (blue line) and going dark (red line). 
Going private numbers are from Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007). Going Dark data are 
from Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2008). 
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Figure 3  Number of IPOs in the US 
 
The figure shows the frequency of IPOs in the U.S. by small (<$50 MM sales) and large 
firms, by year. The figure is from Gao et al (2013). 
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Figure 4: Frequency of foreign firms listing and delisting from US exchanges. 
 
The figure shows thee number of foreign firms listing in the US over time (red line) and 
the number of foreign firms delisting from the U.S. over time (green line). Data from new 
listings are from Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) and for delistings are from Hostak et al 
(2013).  
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Figure 5:  Share of Public Firm market Capitalization in Iliev 2010 
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Figure 6  Securities litigation before and after SOX 
 
Panel A: The figure shows litigation rate for US firms (red line) and litigation rate for 
independent directors on the board of US firms (green line). The graph is from Brochet 
and Srinivasan (2013).  
 
 
 
Panel B:  The figure shows total settlement amounts in securities class actions between 
2003 and 2012 in $ million. The figure is from Ryan and Simmons (2012). 
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Figure 7.  Risk taking and investments  
 
The figure is from Albuquerque and Zhu (2013). Panel A presents capital expenditure 
scaled by total assets. Panel B presents R&D expenditure scaled by total assets. Panel C 
presents Cash holdings scaled by total assets and Panel D presents standard deviation of 
returns. 
 
Panel A: Capital expenditure scaled by total assets  Panel B: R&D expenditure scaled by  
          total  assets 
 
 
    
  
 
 
Panel C: Cash holdings scaled by total assets    Panel D: Standard deviation of returns 
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Figure 8    Restatements and SOX 404 adverse reports 
 
Panel A: The figure presents the time series of reported restatements. Sued restatements 
represent restatements that are followed by a securities class action lawsuit thereby 
indicating a greater severity of the restatement compared to restatements that are not 
followed by a lawsuit. All restatements include sued and non-sued restatements. Data are 
from Audit Analytics, Srinivasan, Wahid and Yu (2013) and Cheng, Srinivasan and Yu 
(2013). 
    
 
 
Panel B: The figure presents the percentage of firms receiving adverse Sec 404 auditor 
attestations of internal control weaknesses as a proportion of all companies. Data are 
from Audit Analytics.  
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Table 1    SEC Enforcement Actions 
 
The table provides descriptive statistics on accounting and auditing enforcement actions 
(AAER) by the SEC over time. Median Asset refers to the median total asset of the firms 
for which an AAER was issued in that particular year. Data used for this table as the 
same as in Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011) and were generously provided by 
Patricia Dechow. 
 
 
Year  Number of AAERs  Median Asset  
$ MM 
1995 35  32.3 
1996 40  16.8 
1997 41  36.8 
1998 17  64.2 
1999 32  73.8 
2000 44  79.0 
2001 28  101.4 
2002 60  163.9 
2003 55  143.0 
2004 59  526.3 
2005 44  785.0 
2006 47  717.2 
2007 46  1967.2 
2008 27  1833.8 
2009 47  543.1 
 
 